The Shannon cipher system is studied in the context of general sources using a notion of computational secrecy introduced by Merhav and Arikan. Bounds are derived on limiting exponents of guessing moments for general sources. The bounds are shown to be tight for i.i.d., Markov, and unifilar sources, thus recovering some known results. A close relationship between error exponents and correct decoding exponents for fixed rate source compression on the one hand and exponents for guessing moments on the other hand is established.
I. INTRODUCTION
W E consider the classical cipher system of Shannon [1] . Let be a message where each letter takes values on a finite set . This message should be communicated securely from a transmitter to a receiver, both of which have access to a common secure key of purely random bits independent of . The transmitter computes the cryptogram and sends it to the receiver over a public channel. The cryptogram may be of variable length. The encryption function is invertible for any fixed . The receiver, knowing and , computes . The functions and are published. A wiretapping attacker has access to the cryptogram , knows and , and attempts to identify without knowledge of . The attacker can use knowledge of the statistics of . We assume that the attacker has a test mechanism that tells him whether a guess is correct or not. For example, the attacker may wish to attack an encrypted password or personal information to gain access to, say, a computer account, or a bank account via internet, or a classified database [2] . In these situations, successful entry into the system provides the natural test mechanism. We assume that the attacker is allowed an unlimited number of guesses. The key rate for the cipher system is nats 1 of secrecy per message (or source) letter.
Merhav and Arikan [2] studied discrete memoryless sources (DMS) in the above setting and characterized the best attainable moments of the number of guesses required by an attacker. In particular, they showed that for a DMS with the governing single letter PMF on , the value of the optimal exponent for the th moment is given by (1) The maximization is over all PMFs on is the Shannon entropy of , and is the Kullback-Leibler divergence between and . They also showed that increases linearly in for , continues to increase in a concave fashion for , where is a threshold, and is constant for . Unlike the classical equivocation rate analysis, atypical sequences do affect the behavior of for and perfect secrecy is obtained, i.e., cryptogram is uncorrelated with the message, only for . Merhav and Arikan also determined the best achievable performance based on the probability of a large deviation in the number of guesses, and showed that it equals the Legendre-Fenchel transform of as a function of . Sundaresan [3] , [17] extended the above results to unifilar sources. Hayashi and Yamamoto [4] proved coding theorems for the Shannon cipher system with correlated outputs where the wiretapper is interested in while the receiver in . In this paper, we extend Merhav and Arikan's notion of computational secrecy [2] to general sources. One motivation is that secret messages typically come from the natural languages which are modeled well as sources with memory, for e.g., a Markov source of appropriate order. Another motivation is that the study of general sources clearly brings out the connection between guessing and compression, as discussed next.
As with other studies of general sources, information spectrum plays crucial role in this paper. We show that is closely related to (a) the error exponent of a rate-source code, and (b) the correct decoding exponent of a rate-source code, when exponentiated probabilities are considered (see Section III.B.2). In particular, the exponents in (a) and (b) appear in the first and second terms below when we rewrite for a DMS as 1 We shall mostly use nat as the unit of information in this paper by taking natural logarithms. k(ln 2)=n nats per input symbol is the same as k=n bits per input symbol.
0018-9448/$26.00 © 2011 IEEE This brings out the fundamental connection between source coding exponents and key-rate constrained guessing exponents. Further, unlike the case for the probability of a large deviation in the number of guesses [2, Sec. V], both the error exponent and the correct decoding exponent determine . We extend the above result to general sources by getting upper and lower bounds on . We then show that these are tight for DMS, Markov and unifilar sources. The bounds may be of interest even if they are not tight because the upper bound specifies the amount of effort need by an attacker and the lower bound specifies the secrecy strength of the cryptosystem to a designer.
The limiting case as in (b) yields classical framework for probability of correct decoding. This special case is related to the work of Han [5] and Iriyama [6] who studied the dual problem of rates required to meet a specified error exponent or a specified correct decoding exponent.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II relates our problem to a modification of Campbell's compression problem [7] . Section III gives bounds on the limits of exponential rate of guessing moments, in terms of information spectrum quantities. Section IV evaluates the bounds for some specific examples. Section V concludes the paper with additional remarks. Proofs are given in the Appendices.
II. GUESSING WITH KEY-RATE CONSTRAINTS AND SOURCE COMPRESSION
In this section, we make a precise statement of our problem, and establish a connection between guessing and source compression subject to a new cost criterion.
Let denote the set of messages and the set of PMFs on
. By a source, we mean a sequence of PMFs , where 2 . Let denote a message put out by the source and the secure key of purely random bits independent of . Recall that the transmitter computes the cryptogram and sends it to the receiver over a public channel.
For a given cryptogram , define a guessing strategy as a bijection that denotes the order in which elements of are guessed. indicates that is the th guess, when the cryptogram is . With knowledge of , the encryption function , and the cryptogram , the attacker can exhaustively calculate the posterior probabilities of all plaintexts given the cryptogram. The attacker's optimal guessing strategy is then to guess in the decreasing order of these posterior probabilities . Let us denote this optimal attack strategy as . The key rate for the system is nats of secrecy per source letter. Let denote the sequence of encryption functions, where denotes the set of natural numbers. This sequence is known to the attacker. We assume that the attacker employs the aforementioned optimal guessing strategy. 2 Sometimes we use P in place of P when we refer to the distribution of the random vector X .
For a given
, key rate , define the normalized guessing exponent
The supremum is taken over all encryption functions. Further define performance limits of guessing moments as in [2] (2)
We next define the related compression quantities. A length function is a mapping that satisfies Kraft's inequality:
where the code alphabet is taken to be binary and . (We shall use to denote the inverse of the natural logarithm ). Every length function yields an attack strategy with a performance characterized as follows.
Proposition 1:
Let be any length function on . There is a guessing list such that for any encryption function , we have 3
Proof: We use a technique of Merhav and Arikan [2] . Let denote the guessing function that ignores the cryptogram and proceeds in the increasing order of lengths. Suppose proceeds in the order . By [8, Prop. 2], [18], we need at most guesses to identify (This is a simple consequence of the fact that there are at most strings of length less than or equal to ). As an alternative attack, consider the exhaustive key-search attack defined by the following guessing list:
where is an arbitrary ordering of the keys. This strategy identifies in at most guesses. Finally, let be the list that alternates between the two lists, skipping those already guessed, i.e., the one that proceeds in the order (4) Clearly, for every , we need at most twice the minimum over the two individual lists.
We now look at a weak converse in the expected sense to the above. We first state without proof the following lemma which associates a length function to any guessing function.
Lemma 2: Given a guessing function
, there exists a length function satisfying (5) where For a proof, we refer the reader to [8, Prop. 1], [18] . We then have the following proposition.
Proposition 3: Fix
. There is an encryption function and a length function such that every guessing strategy (and in particular ) satisfies
Proof: See Appendix A. The proof is an extension of Merhav and Arikan's proof of [2, Th.1] to sources with memory. The idea is to identify an encryption mechanism that maps messages of roughly equal probability to each other. Our proof also suggests an asymptotically optimal encryption strategy for sources with memory.
Remark 1: Note that , so that (6) a fact that will be put to good use in the sequel. Propositions 1 and 3 naturally suggest the following coding problem: identify
The minimum is taken over all possible length functions. We may interpret the cost of using length as being , i.e., the cost is exponential in , but saturates at and so all lengths larger than nats (i.e., bits) enjoy the saturated cost. Then is the minimum normalized exponent of the th moment of this new compression cost. In analogy with (2) and (3), we define
The following is a corollary to Propositions 1 and 3, and relates and .
Corollary 4: For a given , we have (8) Proof: Let be the length function that achieves . Using Proposition 1, and after taking expectation, we have the guessing strategy that satisfies Take logarithms, normalize by , use and to get (8) .
We now state the equivalence between compression and guessing.
Theorem 5 (Guessing-Compression Equivalence): For any and , we have and .
Proof: From Corollary 4 and (6), magnitude of the difference between and decays as and vanishes as . Thus, the problem of finding the optimal guessing exponent is the same as that of finding the optimal exponent for the coding problem in (7) . When , the coding problem in (7) reduces to the one considered by Campbell in [7] ; this is a case where perfect secrecy is obtained and is studied in [8] , [18] . Proposition 1 shows that the optimal length function attaining the minimum in (7) yields an asymptotically optimal attack strategy on the cipher system. Moreover, the encryption strategy in the proof of Proposition 3 (see Appendix A) is asymptotically optimal, from the designer's point of view.
In the rest of the paper we focus on the equivalent compression problem and find bounds on and .
III. GROWTH EXPONENT FOR THE MODIFIED COMPRESSION PROBLEM
We begin with some words on notation. Recall that denotes the set of PMFs on . The Shannon entropy for a is and the Rényi entropy of order is
The Kullback-Leibler divergence or relative entropy between two PMFs and is where means is absolutely continuous with respect to . We shall use to denote a sequence of random variables on , with corresponding sequence of probability measures denoted by . Thus, is a source and its -letter message output. Abusing notation, we let denote the set of all sequences of probability measures, and for each , we define
In the rest of this section is a fixed source. For any and , define
We next state a large deviation result that plays a key role in the derivation of bounds on and .
Proposition 6: For all and , we have
The maximum-achieving distribution in (10) and (11) is the source given by (12) Proof: See Appendix B.
Remark 2:
This proposition is a generalization of Iriyama's [6, Prop. 1], which is obtained by setting .
A. Upper Bound on
We first obtain an upper bound on . We use to denote the expectation with respect to distribution . a fact that can also be gleaned from the variational formula (13) . Divide both sides of (20) by and take limit supremum as to get where the last inequality follows from Proposition 6 and the formula for Rényi entropy. This completes the proof.
From the above proof, it is clear that the upper bound holds with equality, when Jensen's inequality holds with equality in (15), i.e., the random variable tends asymptotically to a constant. This would happen, for example, when normalized encoded lengths concentrate around the entropy rate of the source.
B. Lower Bound on
We now derive a lower bound on . For a given distribution arrange the elements of set in the decreasing order of their -probabilities as done in Sundaresan [3, Sec. IV], [3] . Enumerate the sequences from 1 to . Henceforth refer to a message by its index. Let denote the first elements in the list. We denote the probability of this set by , i.e., and the probability of the complement of this set by . Let the restriction of to this set be . Let denote the length function that attains in (7) . As the length functions are uniquely decipherable we have . Remark 3: The first term contains limit infimum of the error exponent for a ratesource code. The second exponent is the correct decoding exponent for a rate-code when .
Proof: The variational formula (13) applied to the function gives (23) where the interchange of inf and sup yields the lower bound in (23). Fix a distribution and consider the first term in (23). Using the enumeration indicated above, we may write
is the conditional distribution of given . Inequality (24) follows because with the guessing strategy that guesses in decreasing order of probabilities. in (25) denotes the length function given by Lemma 2. Inequality (26) follows from the source coding theorem's lower bound. Substitute (26) in (23), normalize by , and take limit infimum to get may be thought of as a triplet made of and the restriction of to . We now perform the optimization
in four steps.
Step 1: We first optimize over permutations of probabilities over strings. , and remain unchanged over these permutations. Observe that and so the maximum for is attained when the permutation that orders in decreasing order also orders in decreasing order. In particular, equals .
Step denotes the divergence between binary random variables whose probabilities are and respectively. Finally we used variational characterization of Rényi entropy given in (21) to arrive at (30).
Step 4: We now optimize over . Let be a binary random variable defined as
By
we mean the expectation of with respect to the above distribution. Since is a positive random variable, the variational formula yields Continuing with the chain of equalities from (30), we get (31) Finally, normalize both sides of (31) by , take limit infimum, and apply [11, Lemma 1.2.15], which states that the exponential rate of a sum is governed by the maximum of the individual terms' exponential rates, to get the desired result.
In the subsequent subsections we further lower bound each of the two terms under max on the right-hand side of (22). For an arbitrary source, we first recall the source coding error exponent. We also identify the growth rate of sum of exponentiated probabilities of the correct decoding set. We then relate these to the terms in the lower bound obtained in (22). We largely follow the approach and notation of Iriyama [6] , which we now describe.
Given and , we define the upper divergence and lower divergence by For a , denote the spectral sup-entropy-rate [5, Sec. II], [12] as and the spectral inf-entropy-rate as Also define, as in [6, Sec. II], the following quantity which determines the performance under mismatched compression 1) Decoding Error Exponent: In this subsection, we recall the decoding error exponent for fixed-rate encoding of an arbitrary source. We identify the first term in (22) as composed of the exponent of minimum probability of decoding error, and obtain a lower bound for it, or alternatively an upper bound on the error exponent. This is made precise in the following definitions.
By an -code we mean an encoding mapping and a decoding mapping with probability of error . is -achievable if for all there exists a sequence of -codes such that (32) (33)
The infimum fixed-length coding rate for exponent is -On the other hand, the supremum fixed-length coding exponent for rate is -See Iriyama [6] and Han [12, Sec. 1.9] for a pessimistic definition for fixed rate source coding, i.e., the liminf in place of limsup in (32). See also Iriyama and Ihara [13] for both the pessimistic and optimistic definitions. These works obtained bounds on the infimum coding rate. In particular, Iriyama [6, eq. (13)], Iriyama and Ihara [13, eq. (12)] obtained lower bounds on the infimum coding rate under the optimistic definition, the definition of interest to us. We however work with the error exponent, and obtain an upper bound on supremum coding exponent. This suffices to lower bound the first term in (22).
Clearly, satisfies (33), and with is -achievable. It follows from the definition of that so that
The following proposition upper bounds the supremum coding exponent. Unlike the exponent for the probability of error, here can be positive or negative. The infimum fixed-length admissible rate for a given and is -It is easy to see that the set -is closed and so is -admissible. The supremum fixed-length coding exponent for a given and is -Remark 5: The choice of limit infimum in (36) makes the definition of admissibility pessimistic. For , the above definitions reduce to the special case of exponential rate for probability of correct decoding (see [12, Sec. 1.10] ).
Clearly,
should be to maximize the left-hand side of (36), and hence
The following proposition gives an expression for and generalizes [6, Thm. 4 ] to any arbitrary . En route to its derivation, we find the expression for . Proposition 10: For any , we have
Proof: See Appendix D.
C. Summary of Bounds on and
We now combine Propositions 7-10 of the previous subsections to obtain the main result of the paper. 
IV. EXAMPLES
In this section, we evaluate the bounds for some examples where they are tight, and recover some known results.
Example 1 (Perfect Secrecy):
First consider the perfect secrecy case, for example, . Because of Remark 4 and because we may take in the upper bound in (40), the limiting exponential rate of guessing moments simplifies to On account of (11) in Proposition 6, sup in the left-most term is achieved. From Proposition 6, upper and lower bounds are times the liminf and limsup Rényi entropy rates of order . In a related work, we proved in [8, Prop. 7], [18] that whenever the information spectrum of the source satisfies the large deviation property with rate function , the Rényi entropy rate converges and limiting guessing exponent equals the Legendre-Fenchel dual of the scaled rate function , i.e.,
In the next examples, we consider the case .
Example 2 (An iid Source): This example was first studied by Merhav and Arikan [2] . Recall that an iid source is one for which , where denotes the marginal of . We will now evaluate each term in (40). We first argue that (43)
To prove that the left-hand side in (43) is less than or equal to the right-hand side, let be such that . Construct an iid source such that for all . The i.i.d. property easily implies that and the law of large numbers for i.i.d. random variables yields (44) From (44), we have that the infimum on the left-hand side of (43) is over a larger set. We can therefore conclude that " " holds in (43). To prove " " in (43) we use the result (see [12, Th. 1.7.2]) to get that the infimum over a larger set is smaller, i.e.,
Because of (45), it is sufficient to prove
Let be such that . Construct a source such that, for and are independent. Let be another source such that is an iid sequence with distribution As the marginals of and with independent components are the same, it easily follows from the formula for Kullback-Leibler divergence that (47) where (47) follows from the convexity of divergence. From the concavity of Shannon entropy, we also have (48) Normalize by take limsup in (47) and liminf in (48) to get and for a that is a limit point of the sequence . From these, we conclude that (46) holds. This proves (43).
Following a similar procedure as above, we can bound the other terms in (40) for an i.i.d. source as 
Example 3 (Markov Source):
In this example we focus on an irreducible stationary Markov source taking values on and having a transition probability matrix .
Let denote the set of stationary PMFs defined by
Denote the common marginal by and let
We may then denote , where is the distribution of and the conditional distribution of given . Following steps similar to the i.i.d. case, we have where is the conditional one-step entropy, and For a unifilar source the underlying state space forms a Markov chain and the entropy and divergence of the source equals those of the underlying Markov state space source [14, Thm. 6.4.2] . The arguments for the Markov source are now directly applicable to a unifilar source.
V. CONCLUSION
We saw the close connection between the problem of guessing a source realization given a cryptogram and the problem of compression with saturated exponential costs. The latter is a modification of a problem posed by Campbell [7] . Moreover, the exponents for both these problems coincide. This exponent is determined by the error exponent and a generalization of correct decoding exponent for fixed length block source codes.
We 
APPENDIX A PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
Let be any PMF on . Enumerate the elements of from 1 to in the decreasing order of their -probabilities. Let denote the number of distinct key strings. For convenience, we shall assume that is a power of 2 so that the number of key bits is an integer. The general case will be easily handled towards the end of this section.
If does not divide , append a few dummy messages of zero probability to make the number of messages a multiple of . Further, index the messages from 0 to . Henceforth, we identify a message by its index. Divide the messages into groups of so that message belongs to group , where , and is the floor function. Enumerate the key streams from 0 to , so that . The function is now defined as follows. For set where is the bit-wise XOR operation. Thus messages in group are encrypted to messages in the same group. The index identifying the specific message in group , i.e., the last bits of , are encrypted via bit-wise XOR with the key stream. Given and the cryptogram, decryption is clear-perform bit-wise XOR with on the last bits of .
Given a cryptogram , the only information that the attacker gleans is that the message belongs to the group determined by . Indeed, if , then and therefore which decreases with for , because of our enumeration in the decreasing order of probabilities, and is 0 for . The attacker's best strategy is therefore to restrict his guesses to and guess in the order . Thus, when , the optimal attack strategy requires guesses. We now analyze the performance of this attack strategy as follows: 
where (60) follows from the variational formula for Rényi entropy of . The maximum achieving distribution in (62) is given by a fact that is easily verified via direct substitution. We now prove (11); proof of (10) is similar and therefore omitted. We begin by showing " " in (11) . Let be as defined in (12) . It is straightforward to verify by direct substitution that Normalize by and take limit infimum, and use the definition of to get (63)
To prove " " in (11) , let be an arbitrary sequence. We may assume that for all sufficiently large holds; otherwise and the inequality " " holds automatically. Define by It is clear that for every . From Lemma 12, we have (64)
We now study each term on the right-hand side of (64). The entropy term is lower bounded as follows:
The divergence term is upper bounded, as in the proof of Iriyama's [6, Prop. 1], as follows:
To get (66), we used the fact that for all and in inequality (67), we used the relation Substitution of (65) and (67) in (64) and the fact that yield
Since the choice of was arbitrary, we have proved " " in (11) .
From (63) and (11), the maximum is attained by , the distribution defined in (12) . This completes the proof.
APPENDIX C PROOF OF PROPOSITION 9
Iriyama and Ihara showed the following lower bound on the infimum coding rate ([13, Th.3, (12)]) (68)
We claim that (68) is equivalent to (34). This proves the proposition.
We first show that (68) implies (34). Fix the source . Let be a given rate. Consider an arbitrary candidate exponent and an arbitrary source . We argue that -(69)
Taking the infimum on the right-hand side of (69) over with , and then the supremum over will yield (34). To argue (69) by contraposition, we shall show that or equivalently, we shall show that -But the conditions on the left-hand side imply which together with (68) yields , and this is the same as saying is not -achievable. This completes the proof of (68) (34). (This direction suffices to prove Proposition 9). The proof of the other direction is analogous.
To prove the upper bound in (35), we begin with Iriyama's [6, eq. (13)], which is instead of (68). The rest of the proof is completely analogous to the proof of Proposition 9.
APPENDIX D PROOF OF PROPOSITION 10
We use the following notations in this proof. For each define Note that . We will first prove (38). Define a set We can therefore conclude using (70) that the following set equivalence holds:
(72)
From (71) and (72), we get where last equality follows because as proved by Han and Verdú [16] . This proves (38). We now prove (39). We first show that if is -admissible then . Since is -admissible, the definition of and (38) imply that which is the same as saying the following:
(A): For all there exists a such that and . Lemma 13 below implies that there exists a that satisfies and . It follows that and the converse part is proved. For the direct part, fix any , and set
We should show that is -admissible. With set as above, we have (B): For all , there exists a such that and .
Lemma 13 below implies that there exists a that satisfies and . It follows that i.e., is -admissible. This completes the proof.
Lemma 13: If either (A) or (B) holds, then there is a that satisfies and . Proof: We will argue that condition (A) implies the existence of an appropriate . The other argument is analogous and omitted. Our argument is similar to a diagonal argument.
Let (A) hold. Then, for each , we have a that satisfies (a) , which is the same as saying (73) and (b) , which implies (74) Let and consider . Let us now find an subsequence in order to define the desired . Let . Recursively, for each , we have the following. i) From (73) with , we get that there is an such that for any ,
ii) From (74) with , we get that there is an such that for any ,
By taking an , it follows that we can find an such that (75) and (76) hold for all . Define by setting (77) We now show that this has the required properties. We first show . Take any arbitrary , fix , and consider . For any , there is an such that . Use the definition in (77) and the fact that (75) holds for all (with ), to get
We can thus conclude that the inequality holds for all . Since was arbitrary, this establishes that . We next show . Using the definition of , it suffices to show that for every , the following limit holds:
(78) Take any arbitrary , fix an , and consider . There is an for which . Use the definition in (77) and the fact that (76) holds to get for any . Consequently (78) holds, and thence . We have thus shown the existence of an appropriate if (A) holds. A similar argument holds under condition (B).
